A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam
Volume VI
Conduct of the War
Book 2
Functional Analysis

TABLE OF CONTENTS


FOREWORD
iii
PREFACE
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
xxi
LIST OF TABLES
xxv
LIST OF MAPS
xxvii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EX-1 to EX-26

9. INTELLIGENCE
Page
A. Introduction
9-1
B. Getting Involved (1950-1960)
9-2
C. As Counterinsurgents (1961-1964)
9-5
D. Our Sort of War (1965-1968)
9-11
1. Combined Intelligence
9-13
2. Collection Expands
9-17
3. Technical Collection
9-24
4. OPSEC and COMSEC
9-29
5. Phoenix Program
9-29
6. Tet Offensive
9-29
7. Domestic Surveillance
9-34
E. On Vietnamization (1969-1972)
9-34
1. Into the 1970s
9-36
2. Linebacker I & II
9-39
F. From Ceasefire to Collapse (1973-75)
9-41
1. USDAO Saigon
9-41
2. CIA Station
9-43
3. 1974--Enemy Momentum Builds, Analysis Fragmented
9-44
4. 1975--The Last Act
9-46
G. The Enemy
9-48
1. The Enemy's Intelligence
9-48
2. Our Counterintelligence (CI)
9-53
H. Strengths and Weaknesses
9-54
1. US Strengths
9-55
2. US Weaknesses
9-57
3. Enemy Strengths
9-66
4. Enemy Weaknesses
9-69
I. Summary Analysis and Insights
9-70
J. Lessons
9-72
Acronyms for Chapter 9
9-79

10. LOGISTICS AND BASES
A. Introduction
10-1
1. General
10-1
2. Previous Review Efforts
10-1
B. The Logistic Effort
10-2
1. French Phase of the War (1950-1954)
10-3
2. Military Assistance Advisory Phase (1954-1962)
10-3
3. MACV Advisory Period (1962-1964)
10-3
4. Major US Combat Involvement (1965-1968)
10-4
5. US Redeployment and Vietnamization Phase (1969-1972)
10-4
6. Vietnam's Abandonment: US Phase Out (1973-1975)
10-4
C. Southeast Asian Environment From A Logistic Viewpoint
10-5
D. Support of the French
10-7
1. The Beginning
10-7
2. MAAG, Indochina
10-7
3. Magnitude of Aid
10-8
4. Effectiveness of the Aid
10-9
5. French-US Transition Period
10-10
E. France Leaves South Vietnam
10-13
F. Supporting RVNAF
10-16
1. General
10-16
2. The Equipment
10-17
3. The Standardized Division Structure
10-17
4. Non-Division Logistic Organization
10-18
5. Supply of RVNAF
10-24
6. Support of Para-Military Forces Prior to 1965
10-27
7. Logistic Training of RVNAF
10-29
G. Building and Protecting Bases and Lines of Communications
10-33
1. Introduction
10-33
2. Base Development Effort in the Military Assistance Advisory Era
10-35
3. Base Development in the MACV Era
10-37
4. Facilities Engineering and Its Relationship to Base Development
10-42
5. Contractual Effort
10-45
6. Construction Material
10-50
7. Bases and LOC Security Resulting from Base Development Program
10-51
H. The US Way of War (1965-1968)
10-53
1. Early Logistic Support Fragmented
10-53
2. The Move to Centralization in Army Logistics (1962-1965)
10-56
3. Army Logistic Posture (1 January 1965)
10-57
4. Production Base
10-58
5. Pacific Theater Logistically
10-59
6. Contingency Plans Not Implemented
10-61
I. Summary Analysis and Insights
10-61
J. Lessons
10-66

11. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COOPERATION
A. Introduction
11-1
B. While Advising and Supporting (1950-1964)
11-3
1. Six Years with the French
11-3
2. The Changing Scene
11-5
3. The Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission
11-5
4. The French Recede
11-6
5. Lack of Unity
11-6
6. Diem Had the Power
11-6
7. The Insurgency Spreads Rapidly
11-8
8. Diem Dies and So Does Counterinsurgency
11-9
9. The Period in Perspective
11-10
C. GVN and RVNAF
11-10
1. The Problem: How Best to Organize to Fight a "Two-Faced War"?
11-10
2. The French Legacy
11-11
3. The US Moves In
11-13
4. Diem, Nhu, and Others
11-16
5. Many "Armies"
11-17
6. The Big War
11-19
7. Battles and Leaders
11-19
8. The Verdict
11-23
D. Coalition War and Combined Command
11-24
1. Model for the Future
11-24
2. Historical Precedents
11-26
3. Vietnam Was Unique
11-28
4. The Case For and Against a Combined Command
11-28
5. The US Decision
11-34
6. The Compromise Solutions
11-36
7. The Balance Sheet
11-37
8. The Bottom Line
11-38
E. The US Organizes for War in Indochina
11-40
1. A Unified Command?
11-40
2. The US and Joint Warfare
11-40
3. The Theater(s) of War
11-41
4. Fragmentation of the War(s)
11-42
5. Two Views on a SEACOM
11-43
6. Other Views and Factors
11-44
7. The Verdict
11-46
8. On Balance
11-48
F. Control of US Airpower
11-48
1. Historical Setting
11-48
2. Service Positions
11-50
3. Controlling the Air War(s)
11-52
4. Attempts to Centralize Control
11-55
5. The Price of Fragmentation
11-57
6. The Showdown
11-58
7. A Step Forwards and Backwards
11-62
8. In Retrospect
11-62
G. Communications
11-63
1. Young RVNAF
11-63
2. The US Build Up
11-64
3. Crisis Management and Fighting Wars
11-65
4. The Enemy Listens In
11-67
5. US Withdrawal
11-67
6. In Retrospect
11-68
H. Who Had the Helm in Washington?
11-69
1. The Focus
11-69
2. The Commander-in-Chief
11-69
3. The Joint Chiefs: Generals and Admirals
11-71
I. Summary Analysis and Insights
11-80
1. Advising and Supporting
11-81
2. GVN and RVNAF
11-81
3. Coalition Warfare
11-82
4. The US Joint War
11-82
5. Control of US Airpower
11-83
6. Communications
11-83
7. The USG and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
11-84
J. Lessons
11-84

12. THE ADVISORY EFFORT
A. Introduction
12-1
B. The Environment
12-2
C. Historical Overview
12-3
1. Introduction
12-3
2. The Period of French-American Cooperation
12-3
3. Expansion of the US Advisory Effort
12-5
4. Height of US Involvement
12-9
5. Vietnamization
12-9
6. Summary
12-10
D. The Advisor
12-10
1. Selection
12-10
2. Training
12-11
3. Motivation, Morale, and Attitudes
12-12
E. The Advisor in Vietnam
12-14
1. Status and Role from the Vietnamese Point of View
12-14
2. Relations with Counterparts
12-15
3. Quantity of Advice
12-17
4. Quality of Advice
12-18
5. Effectiveness
12-19
F. Major Advisory Successes and Failures
12-21
1. Successes
12-21
2. Failures
12-22
G. Insights
12-26
H. Lessons
12-27
Appendix
12-28

13. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
A. Introduction
13-1
B. Early PSYOPS Efforts in Vietnam
13-2
1. The French Effort
13-2
2. Advising the Vietnamese
13-3
C. The United States Approach
13-4
1. Policy and Organization
13-4
2. Operating Activities
13-9
3. CORDS PSYOP
13-9
4. MACV PSYOP
13-12
D. GVN PSYOP Activities
13-16
E. VC Psychological Operations
13-18
1. NLF Social Organization as a Communications Device
13-18
2. NLF PSYOPS Structure
13-19
F. Analytical Summary
13-22
G. Insights
13-28
H. Lessons
13-29

14. CIVIL AFFAIRS
A. Introduction
14-1
B. Strategy for the Conduct of the War
14-3
C. A Definition of Terms and Review of Early Capabilities
14-3
1. Civil Affairs Categories
14-5
2. Military Civic Action
14-5
3. Pacification and Vietnamization
14-7
4. Army Civil Affairs Capabilities
14-8
D. Early Civil Affairs Activities (Before CORDS)
14-8
1. The Marines' Combined Action Experiment: Winning the Hamlet War
14-10
2. Other Military Efforts
14-15
3. MILCAP
14-15
E. CORDS - The Marriage of Civil Operations with Revolutionary Development
14-15
F. Problems that Impeded Effective Civil Affairs Actions
14-31
1. In the Military
14-31
2. Civil Affairs Experience
14-31
3. Indigenous Problems
14-32
4. Institutional Inertia
14-34
5. Other Problems that Impeded Effective Civil Affairs Actions
14-36
G. Some Views of Pacification
14-37
H. Summary Analysis and Insights
14-39
I. Lessons
14-41
Appendix A
14-43
Appendix B
14-49

15. MEASURES OF PROGRESS, OR KEEPING SCORE
A. Introduction
15-1
1. The Issue
15-1
2. Historical Setting
15-2
B. The Search for a Mop Handle in Vietnam
15-3
C. The Pivotal Honolulu Conference, February 1966
15-6
1. The Conference
15-6
2. Instructions and Goals
15-6
3. COMUSMACV's Concept
15-7
4. The Pressure
15-7
D. The Score Cards Chosen
15-7
1. The Hamlet Evaluation System
15-7
2. Other Yardsticks
15-10
E. Use of the Data
15-13
1. General
15-13
2. In Saigon
15-13
3. In Washington
15-13
F. Usefulness of the MOP
15-15
1. Criteria
15-15
2. Use
15-15
3. Impact on the Conflict
15-16
G. Summary Analysis
15-22
1. Statistics
15-22
2. Difficulties in Measuring Progress
15-25
H. Insights
15-27
I. Lessons
15-28

16. OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS
A. Introduction
16-1
B. The Origins of Technological Support in RVN
16-1
1. Field Units
16-2
2. DDR& E
16-2
3. The Services and R& D
16-3
4. MACV Significant Program Areas
16-4
5. The R & D Cycle and Cooperation
16-5
C. Airmobile Innovations
16-6
1. General
16-6
2. Background
16-7
3. Early Initiatives
16-8
4. US Ground Forces Arrive in Vietnam
16-10
5. Subsequent Airmobile Innovations
16-10
D. Infantry and Armor
16-16
E. Engineering Support
16-16
F. Riverine Activity
16-16
G. Field Artillery
16-21
H. Sensors
16-23
I. Communist Tactical and Technical Innovations
16-25
1. Mines and Booby Traps
16-25
2. North Vietnamese Air Defense Systems
16-25
J. Summary Analysis
16-27
K. Insights
16-30
L. Lessons
16-31
Appendix
16-33

17. ALLIES
A. Introduction
17-1
B. US Efforts to Enlist Support
17-3
1. Background
17-3
2. US Appeal for "More Flags"
17-5
3. SEATO's Failure to Produce Flags
17-7
C. Overview of Allied Combat Support to Vietnam
17-11
1. General
17-11
2. Areas of Operation and Capabilities of Third Nation Forces
17-11
D. Allied Support and the Conduct of the War
17-16
E. Summary Analysis and Insights
17-20
F. Lessons
17-22
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BB-1 to BB-15

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