TABLE OF CONTENTS
| FOREWORD | iii |
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| PREFACE | v |
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS | xiii |
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| LIST OF FIGURES | xix |
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| LIST OF MAPS | xxiii |
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| LIST OF TABLES | xxiii |
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| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | EX-1 to EX-16 |
| 1. | OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES | Page |
| A. | Introduction | 1-1 |
| B. | A Review of DRV, NLF (PRP & PRG), USSR, and PRC Objectives and Strategies | 1-2 |
1. The Objectives and Strategies of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Review |
1-2 |
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2. The Objectives and Strategies of the National Liberation Front in Review |
1-3 |
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3. Objectives and Strategies of the Soviet Union in Review |
1-6 |
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4. Objectives and Strategies of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Review |
1-7 |
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| C. | A Review Of US, GVN, and Allied Objectives and Strategies | 1-9 |
1. The Objectives and Strategies of the United States (US) and South Vietnam in Review |
1-9 |
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2. The Objectives and Strategies of Major Allied Participants in Review |
1-13 |
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| D. | An Assessment of US-Allied and Enemy Strategies and Objectives: Problems, Exploitable Differences, Contradictions, and Misperceptions | 1-15 |
| E. | Insights | 1-21 |
| F. | Lessons | 1-22 |
| 2. | US FOREIGN POLICY | |
| A. | Introduction | 2-1 |
| B. | Phased Assessment of US Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia | 2-4 |
1. Historical Antecedents |
2-4 |
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2. Phase 1: 1945 to 1961 |
2-4 |
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3. Phase 2: 1961 to 1965 |
2-21 |
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4. Phase 3: 1965 to 1969 |
2-38 |
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5. Phase 4: 1969 to 1975 |
2-43 |
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| C. | Insights | 2-47 |
| D. | Lessons | 2-49 |
| 3. | CONTINGENCY PLANNING | |
| A. | Introduction | 3-1 |
| B. | Peacetime Perspectives | 3-2 |
1. Military Strategic Planning |
3-2 |
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2. Objectives |
3-3 |
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3. Planning Highlights |
3-5 |
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4. CINCPAC OPLAN 32-59 |
3-7 |
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5. Related Plans |
3-10 |
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6. Constraints on Planning Options |
3-10 |
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| C. | Plans Actually Implemented | 3-13 |
1. OPLANs 34A and 37-64 |
3-13 |
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2. Changing Perceptions |
3-14 |
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3. No Reserve Call-up |
3-15 |
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4. Planning Deployment in SVN |
3-15 |
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5. Other Factors |
3-17 |
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6. MACV Contingency Planning Post 1965 |
3-17 |
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| D. | Assessment of Planning Effectiveness | 3-18 |
| E. | Summary Analysis and Insights | 3-19 |
| F. | Lessons | 3-21 |
| 4. | MOBILIZATION | |
| A. | Introduction | 4-1 |
| B. | Mobilization: of the Reserves: A Difficult Presidential Decision | 4-2 |
1. Background |
4-2 |
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2. Mobilization: The Backbone of Early Contingency Planning (1954-1961) |
4-5 |
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3. The Bay of Pigs Fiasco and the Berlin Crisis: Reason to Mobilize |
4-6 |
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4. Other Crisis Situations (1962-1965) |
4-9 |
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5. The US Military Commitment to Vietnam: 1965 to 1968 |
4-10 |
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6. Mini-Mobilization: The Pueblo Incident and Tet 1968 |
4-15 |
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7. Vietnamization and Withdrawal: 1969-1972 |
4-24 |
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8. Post-War Impacts: Down to a Zero Draft |
4-26 |
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9. A Lesson Learned |
4-30 |
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| C. | Summary Analysis and Insights | 4-31 |
| D. | Lessons | 4-32 |
| 5. | PACIFICATION AND VIETNAMIZATION | |
| A. | Introduction | 5-1 |
| B. | Pacification: A Key Variable in the Counterinsurgency Formula | 5-2 |
1. Early Pacification Efforts |
5-2 |
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2. The Process Defined |
5-4 |
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| C. | Early Pacification Efforts: The Ngo Experiments (1954-1963) | 5-6 |
1. Civic Action |
5-7 |
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2. The Land Development Program |
5-9 |
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3. Agglomeration Camps and Agrovilles |
5-12 |
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4. Strategic Hamlets |
5-17 |
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5. The Civilians' Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) Experiment |
5-26 |
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6. The Territorial Forces -- Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps |
5-28 |
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7. Early Program Results and Impact on the War Effort |
5-30 |
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| D. | Follow-On Pacification: The US Search for a New Strategy (1964-1967) | 5-33 |
1. New Life Hamlets and the Hop Tac Effort - The US Takes Charge |
5-33 |
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2. Rural Construction: A Push for a Social Revolution |
5-40 |
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3. Revolutionary Development: Emphasis on the Other War |
5-43 |
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4. US Participation: Looking for the Right Organization |
5-45 |
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5. The American Solutions: A Proliferation of Approaches |
5-46 |
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6. Program Results and Impact on the War Effort |
5-47 |
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| E. | The New Model Pacification Program: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (1967-1973) | 5-48 |
1. The Tet Offensive: Getting Back on the Track and Accelerating the Pacification Process |
5-52 |
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2. The Easter Offensive: A Setback for Both North and South |
5-59 |
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3. Measures of Success: Reaching for the Brass Ring |
5-59 |
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| F. | Vietnamization: An End to Americanization (1968-1975) | 5-62 |
1. Definition and Purpose |
5-62 |
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2. Vietnamization as Viewed by the Vietnamese |
5-64 |
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| G. | Insights | 5-68 |
1. Knowing the Enemy and Our Ally |
5-68 |
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2. Pacification |
5-68 |
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3. Vietnamization |
5-72 |
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| H. | Lessons | 5-73 |
| 6. | US WITHDRAWAL | |
| A. | Introduction | 6-1 |
| B. | Considerations in Planning and Implementing US Withdrawal | 6-3 |
1. Withdrawal Goals |
6-4 |
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2. Change in Objectives for the Field Commander |
6-6 |
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3. Concepts for Planning Withdrawal at the Field Command |
6-7 |
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| C. | Assessment of US Withdrawal | 6-9 |
1. Influences Leading to Withdrawal |
6-9 |
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2. Consequences of US Withdrawal on the War |
6-11 |
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3. Consequences of US Withdrawal on International Relations |
6-13 |
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4. Consequences of the War on Asian Power Relationships |
6-14 |
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5. Consequences of US Withdrawal Planning |
6-14 |
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| D. | Summary Analysis and Insights | 6-15 |
| E. | Lessons | 6-18 |
| Appendix | 6-20 |
| 7. | NEGOTIATIONS | |
| A. | Introduction | 7-1 |
| B. | Phased Analysis of Negotiations | 7-2 |
1. Phase 1: Post-WWII to 1961 |
7-2 |
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2. Phase 2: 1961 to Mid-1968 |
7-13 |
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3. Phase 3: The Paris Negotiations -- The Nixon and Kissinger Years |
7-38 |
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4. Insights |
7-64 |
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| C. | Lessons | 7-68 |
| Appendix | 7-71 |
| 8. | FOLLOW-ON EFFORT | |
| A. | Introduction | 8-2 |
| B. | Post-Treaty/Post-Withdrawal: The Basis for and Nature of the US Commitment to South Vietnam | 8-2 |
1. Commitments Based on Private Presidential Assurances |
8-2 |
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2. Commitments Based on the US Interpretation of the Paris Peace Accords |
8-4 |
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3. US Aid Commitments to South Vietnam: "Operation Enhance"/"Enhance Plus" |
8-5 |
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4. US Commitments To Aid and Defend South Vietnam: The US Congress and Its Effect on the US Follow-On Effort |
8-6 |
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| C. | Evaluation of the US Follow-On Effort: Problems, Effectiveness, and Results | 8-16 |
| D. | Insights | 8-20 |
| E. | Lessons | 8-23 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | B-1 to B-17 |