TABLE OF CONTENTS
| FOREWORD | iii |
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| PREFACE | v |
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| TABLE OF CONTENTS | xiii |
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| LIST OF FIGURES | xix |
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| LIST OF TABLES | xxi |
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| LIST OF MAPS | xxiii |
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| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | EX-1 to EX-12 |
| 1. | CHANGING SOCIETY | Page |
| A. | Introduction | 1-1 |
| B. | Bases for Unity Inherent in Vietnamese Society at the Time of the French Withdrawal | 1-8 |
| C. | Bases for Disunity Inherent in Vietnamese Society | 1-12 |
| D. | American Impact on Vietnamese Society | 1-25 |
| E. | Insights | 1-33 |
| F. | Lesson | 1-34 |
| 2. | GOVERNMENT | |
| A. | Introduction | 2-1 |
1. The Political Culture: A Historical Perspective |
2-3 |
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2. The French Legacy |
2-4 |
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| B. | The GVN: An Organizational Perspective | 2-5 |
1. The Diem Regime |
2-5 |
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2. The Thieu-Ky Regime |
2-8 |
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| C. | The GVN: A Functional Perspective | 2-13 |
1. Democratic Government - Contrasting Perceptions |
2-14 |
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2. Democratic Government: An Alien Import |
2-16 |
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3. Democratic Government and the War Effort |
2-18 |
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4. Democratic Government: A Splendored Irrelevance |
2-20 |
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5. GVN and the United States: An Exercise in Misperception |
2-21 |
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| F. | Insights and Lessons | 2-27 |
1. Evolution of the GVN: Variation on a Common Theme |
2-27 |
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2. US-GVN Relations: A Conflict of Priorities and Perspectives |
2-30 |
| 3. | CLIMATE, GEOGRAPHY AND TRANSPORTATION | |
| A. | Introduction | 3-1 |
| B. | Climate | 3-2 |
| C. | Geography | 3-4 |
1. General |
3-4 |
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2. Topography |
3-6 |
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3. Military Geographic Regions |
3-6 |
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4. Strategic Areas |
3-8 |
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| D. | Transportation | 3-15 |
1. General |
3-15 |
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2. Railroads |
3-16 |
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3. Highways-Roads |
3-16 |
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4. Inland Waterways |
3-20 |
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5. Ports |
3-22 |
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6. Airfields |
3-23 |
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| E. | Analysis of Implications | 3-25 |
1. Population Patterns |
3-25 |
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2. Geography |
3-31 |
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3. Topography |
3-32 |
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4. Climate and Weather |
3-34 |
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| F. | Summary Analysis and Insights | 3-36 |
1. Influence of Population Centers |
3-36 |
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2. Climate and Weather |
3-37 |
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3. Geography |
3-37 |
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4. Topography and Transportation |
3-38 |
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5. The US Soldier in Vietnam |
3-39 |
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6. A Final Insight |
3-39 |
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| G. | Lesson | 3-39 |
| 4. | THE ECONOMY | |
| A. | Introduction | 4-1 |
| B. | Profile "Snapshot" of the Economy in 1954 | 4-2 |
1. The French Legacy |
4-2 |
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2. Impact of the First Indochina War |
4-4 |
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3. US Plans and Support |
4-5 |
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| C. | The Diem Era (1955-1963) | 4-6 |
1. Problems and Plans |
4-6 |
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2. The Enemy Reacts |
4-8 |
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3. Implications for the Economy and the War |
4-9 |
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| D. | Revolving Governments (1964-1967) | 4-10 |
1. Political and Economic Chaos |
4-10 |
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2. The Impact of the "Big War" and US Presence |
4-13 |
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3. US Counteractions |
4-15 |
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4. Implications for the Economy and the Wars |
4-20 |
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| E. | Thieu and Ky (1967-1972) | 4-21 |
1. More Stability |
4-21 |
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2. Tet 1968 and Mobilization |
4-22 |
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3. Pacification and Land Reform |
4-24 |
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4. Vietnamization and US Withdrawal |
4-24 |
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5. Land to the Tiller (LTTT) |
4-25 |
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6. More Corruption |
4-26 |
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7. Implications for the Economy and the War |
4-27 |
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| F. | The Slide Downhill (1973-1975) | 4-27 |
1. Paris, Washington and Watergate |
4-27 |
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2. Foreign Aid: The US vs the USSR and the PRC |
4-29 |
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3. Inflation and Oil |
4-29 |
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4. Implications for the Economy and the War |
4-29 |
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| G. | Summary and Insights | 4-31 |
| H. | Lessons | 4-33 |
| 5. | THE MILITARY | |
| A. | Introduction | 5-1 |
| B. | Development of the Vietnamese Armed Forces | 5-2 |
1. Army of Vietnam (ARVN) |
5-2 |
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2. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) |
5-12 |
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3. The Vietnamese Navy (VNN) |
5-13 |
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4. The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) |
5-14 |
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5. Critical Issues |
5-14 |
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6. Implications for US Policies |
5-16 |
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7. Significant Insights |
5-18 |
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| C. | Leadership Qualities | 5-20 |
1. Introduction |
5-20 |
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2. Historical Perspectives and Analysis |
5-20 |
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3. Critical Issues |
5-33 |
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4. Implications for Future US Policies |
5-34 |
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5. Significant Insights |
5-36 |
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| D. | Efficiency and Reliability | 5-38 |
1. US View of RVNAF Efficiency and Reliability |
5-38 |
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2. Military Decision-Making/RVNAF Command and Control |
5-42 |
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3. Unit Organization and Equipment |
5-45 |
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4. Critical Issues |
5-47 |
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| E. | Summary Analysis and Insights | 5-53 |
| F. | Lessons | 5-56 |
| 6. | MORALE AND WILL | |
| A. | Introduction | 6-1 |
| B. | The Challenge of Building National Support | 6-2 |
| C. | Factors That Affected South Vietnamese Morale and Will | 6-3 |
1. National Liberation Front (NLF) (Viet Cong) Terror Tactics |
6-3 |
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2. Insufficient Local Security |
6-8 |
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3. Weak GVN/Local Leadership |
6-10 |
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4. Corrupt GVN/Local Officials |
6-11 |
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5. Morale and Will of the RVNAF |
6-13 |
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6. Other Factors |
6-17 |
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| D. | GVN/US Initiatives and Programs | 6-19 |
1. Objectives |
6-20 |
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2. Early GVN/US Pacification Efforts |
6-20 |
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3. Pacification After the Honolulu Conference |
6-23 |
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| E. | Degree of Public Support for the War Effort | 6-30 |
1. Diem's Years of Rebuilding: 1954 to 1961 |
6-30 |
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2. Downfall of Diem's Regime and Increased US Involvement: 1962 to 1964 |
6-31 |
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3. US Force Build-Up and Major Involvement: 1965 to 1968 |
6-32 |
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4. Vietnamization and US Force Withdrawal:1969 to 1973 (Post-Tet Period) |
6-33 |
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5. The Final Collapse: 1973 to 1975 |
6-33 |
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| F. | Insights | 6-34 |
| G. | Lesson | 6-35 |
| 7. | CONSTRAINTS ON RVN POLICY | |
| A. | Introduction | 7-1 |
| B. | In the Beginning: 1954-1960 | 7-2 |
1. The Geneva Accords |
7-2 |
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2. Social and Psychological |
7-5 |
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3. Political and Economic |
7-7 |
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4. The Enemy |
7-10 |
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5. Geo-Strategic Position |
7-12 |
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6. The Military |
7-15 |
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7. Allies and Aid |
7-18 |
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8. Implications of Constraints |
7-19 |
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9. The Period in Perspective |
7-22 |
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| C. | During the Mid Years (1961-1968) | 7-24 |
1. Geneva Accords |
7-24 |
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2. Social and Psychological |
7-24 |
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3. Political and Economic |
7-27 |
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4. The Enemy: PLAF and NVA |
7-29 |
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5. Geo-Strategic Position |
7-31 |
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6. Military: RVNAF |
7-32 |
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7. Allies and Aid |
7-33 |
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8. Mobilization |
7-37 |
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9. Implications of Constraints |
7-42 |
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10. The Period in Perspective |
7-43 |
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| D. | Towards the End (1969-1975) | 7-45 |
1. Geneva to Paris |
7-45 |
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2. Social and Psychological |
7-45 |
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3. Political and Economic |
7-46 |
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4. The Enemy: PAVN and PLAF |
7-47 |
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5. Geo-Strategic Position |
7-48 |
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6. Military: RVNAF |
7-50 |
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7. Allies and Aid |
7-52 |
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8. Implications of Constraints |
7-54 |
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9. The Period in Perspective |
7-54 |
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| E. | Summary of Insights | 7-57 |
1. Negotiations |
7-59 |
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2. Social and Psychological |
7-59 |
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3. Political and Economic |
7-60 |
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4. The Enemy |
7-61 |
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5. Geo-Strategic Position |
7-62 |
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6. Military: RVNAF |
7-62 |
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7. Allies and Aid |
7-63 |
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| F. | Lessons | 7-64 |
| G. | A Final Word on Constraints | 7-65 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | B-1 to B-17 |