CONTENTS
| LIST OF ACRONYMS | ix | ||
| PART ONE: THE NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY | 1 | ||
| A. | THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR INHERITANCE | 3 | |
| B. | COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS | 7 | |
| C. | EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUGGLE | 11 | |
| PART TWO: SECURITY | 23 | ||
| INTRODUCTION | 25 | ||
| I. | EVOLUTION OF SECURITY CONCEPTS AND SUPPORT PROGRAMS | 29 | |
| A. | THE CONCEPTUAL LEGACY | 29 | |
| B. | SOUTH VIETNAM | 32 | |
| II. | STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES OF THE REGULAR FORCES | 45 | |
| A. | BACKGROUND | 45 | |
| B. | THE DEFENSIVE VERSUS THE OFFENSIVE | 48 | |
| C. | THE LIMITED OFFENSIVE | 52 | |
| III. | SECURITY FORCE CONSTRAINTS -- STRENGTH, LEADERSHIP, AND TRAINING | 57 | |
| A. | QUANTITATIVE CONSTRAINTS -- FORCE BALANCE, STRENGTH, AND EQUIPMENT | 58 | |
| B. | QUALITATIVE CONSTRAINTS -- LEADERSHIP, MORALE, AND MOTIVATION | 60 | |
| C. | QUALITATIVE CONSTRAINTS -- TRAINING | 65 | |
| IV. | THE ROLE OF A GRASS ROOTS MILITIA--WHEN SHOULD THE PEOPLE BE ARMED? | 77 | |
| V. | THE FORCE FOR LAW AND ORDER IN THE COUNTRYSIDE -- A NATIONAL POLICE FORCE OR A CONSTABULARY? | 81 | |
| VI. | THE APPROPRIATE FORCE FOR ATTACK OF THE INSURGENT INFRASTRUCTURE -- THE MILITARY, THE TERRITORIALS, RD CADRE, OR THE NATIONAL POLICE? | 85 | |
| A. | VCI NEUTRALIZATION EFFORTS | 87 | |
| B. | THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM | 93 | |
| VII. | OVER-ALL APPRAISAL OF THE SECURITY SITUATION | 95 | |
| VIII. | LESSONS LEARNED | 99 | |
| A. | GENERAL | 99 | |
| B. | CONCEPTUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL | 101 | |
| C. | STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL | 102 | |
| D. | PRIORITIES FOR, AND TYPES OF SECURITY FORCES | 104 | |
| E. | THE TRAINING AND ADVISORY EFFORT | 108 | |
| PART THREE: DEVELOPMENT | 111 | ||
| I. | MAJOR DEVELOPMENT ISSUES | 113 | |
| II. | VILLAGE AND HAMLET ADMINISTRATION | 119 | |
| A. | THE EARLY CONTEST FOR CONTROL AT THE LOCAL LEVEL | 120 | |
| B. | "NEW LIFE HAMLETS" YIELD TO REEMPHASIS ON THE VILLAGES | 123 | |
| C. | PESIDENT THIEU'S STRESS ON LOCAL ADMINISTRATION | 125 | |
| D. | CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENT | 127 | |
| III. | THE EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT | 131 | |
| A. | EARLY CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS | 131 | |
| B. | "COUNTERINSURGENCY" AND THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM | 140 | |
| C. | INTERREGNUM: DEBATE OVER STRATEGY | 146 | |
| D. | REEMPHASIS ON PACIFICATION | 151 | |
| IV. | DEVELOPMENT OF CADRE TECHNIQUES | 161 | |
| A. | CIVIC ACTION PERIOD | 161 | |
| B. | STRATEGIC HAMLET PERIOD | 162 | |
| C. | POST-DIEM PERIOD | 166 | |
| D. | RECENT STATUS OF CADRE PROGRAMS | 170 | |
| V. | THREE FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF DEVELOPMENT INTEREST | 173 | |
| A. | ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT | 173 | |
| B. | THE MILITARY FORCES IN CIVIC ACTION | 177 | |
| C. | THE REFUGEE PROBLEM | 180 | |
| VI. | LESSONS LEARNED | 183 | |
| PART FOUR: REPORTING AND EVALUATION | 191 | ||
| INTRODUCTION | 193 | ||
| I. | DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF DIEM | 195 | |
| A. | SEPARATE AGENCY REPORTING | 195 | |
| B. | EARLY PACIFICATION REPORTING | 199 | |
| C. | OTHER REPORTING SOURCES | 201 | |
| II. | REASSESSMENT AND TRANSITION | 207 | |
| A. | REASSESSMENT EFFORTS | 207 | |
| B. | NEW FIELD REPORTING SYSTEM | 210 | |
| III. | THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES) | 215 | |
| A. | AFTERMATH OF HONOLULU CONFERENCE | 215 | |
| B. | INTRODUCTION OF THE HES | 219 | |
| C. | HES-70 | 224 | |
| D. | SUBORDINATE AND ASSOCIATED HES REPORTS | 226 | |
| IV. | LESSONS LEARNED IN REPORTING AND EVALUATION | 229 | |
| PART FIVE: SELECTED RELATED ISSUES | 237 | ||
| I. | THE URBAN PROBLEM | 239 | |
| A. | INTRODUCTION | 239 | |
| B. | VIETNAM'S CITIES IN THE INSURGENCY | 239 | |
| C. | VIETNAM'S CITIES IN THE FUTURE | 244 | |
| D. | THIRD WORLD CITIES IN FUTURE INSURGENCIES | 247 | |
| E. | CONCLUSIONS | 250 | |
| II. | LAND REFORM | 251 | |
| A. | INTRODUCTION | 251 | |
| B. | EARLY GVN LAND REFORM EFFORTS | 251 | |
| C. | INTERIM EFFORTS | 256 | |
| D. | LAND-TO-THE-TILLER | 258 | |
| E. | LESSONS LEARNED | 263 | |
| III. | ORGANIZATION | 265 | |
| A. | INITIAL AMERICAN EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE THE OTHER WAR | 266 | |
| B. | REAPPRAISAL | 285 | |
| C. | THE VIETNAMESE ORGANIZATION TO DEAL WITH PACIFICATION | 295 | |
| D. | SOME LESSONS | 300 | |
| IV. | ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM, 1963-1969 | 305 | |
| A. | INTRODUCTION | 305 | |
| B. | STATUS AND CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY | 307 | |
| C. | CONTRIBUTION OF US AID AND PURCHASES TO THE ECONOMY | 314 | |
| D. | SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AGGRAVATED BY THE ADMINISTRATION OF US PURCHASES AND AID | 320 | |
| E. | RELEVANCE TO CURRENT US FOREIGN POLICY | 326 | |
| MAP OF SOUTH VIETNAM ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS | 330 | ||
| ANNEX: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND CONSULTED | 331 | ||